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Abstract—The paper focuses on the problem how a community
of distributed agents may autonomously invent and coordinate
lexicons and grammars. Although our earlier experiments have
shown that a communication system can indeed emerge in a
socio-cultural dynamics, it relies on the control of complexity
by the experimenter, so that agents first acquire words, then
simple constructions, and then more complex ones. This paper
addresses the question how agents could themselves regulate the
complexity both of the mechanisms they bring to bear to the
language task and on the semantic complexity of what they want
to express. We make use of the autotelic principle, coming from
psychology. It requires monitoring challenge and skill (based on
actual performance) and maintaining a ’flow’ regime balancing
the two. We show in computational experiments that the autotelic
principle is capable to explain autonomous scaffolding towards
greater complexity in the emergence of language.
I. INTRODUCTION
Research into the origins of grammar has been making
substantial progress lately (see recent overviews in [10], [17],
[4], a.o.). In our own work we have focused on a socio-
cultural approach which relies on four important ideas [18].
First, it relies crucially on a peer-to-peer social dynamics
within a community of agents, similar to models of opinion
dynamics [8]. Each agent is capable to generate structure
and then aligns this progressively with other agents based
on local feedback in language games. Many simulations [17],
as well as theoretical research [1] have now shown that this
leads to self-organised coherence of lexicons, grammars, and
ontologies without prior innate structure nor global control.
Second the socio-cultural approach takes a functional rather
than structural view of language, in line with cognitive lin-
guistics [5]. Syntax is argued to be motivated by attempts to
solve some aspect of the communication problem, for example,
avoid uncertainty in who is playing what role in an event (as in
“John gives Mary a book” versus “Mary gives John a book”)
or avoid combinatorial search in parsing. Third, the socio-
cultural approach to language emergence sees an important
role for intelligence both in the invention of new language
forms that solve certain problems in communication and in
the learning of new conventions invented by somebody else by
guessing the communicative intentions and understanding the
relation between structure and function. Learning is not simply
a matter of imitation but of understanding at some level the
function of language structure in communication. And finally,
the language faculty is not seen as a genetically fixed network
of highly specialised modules but as a dynamically assembled
collection of processes that have generic functions. The agent
recruits new cognitive mechanisms as needed or expands the
resources of mechanisms that make up his language faculty
[19].
In socio-cultural models, it is crucial to model embodied
situated communications because this is the only way to get a
realistic measure of communicative success. Our own multi-
agent experiments go as far as using real robots to increase
the realism of the experiments and examine how constraints
coming from embodiment may shape the emergent languages
[13]. Whereas earlier work focused on understanding how a
social peer-to-peer dynamics can lead to a shared language
inventory, our current focus, as illustrated in the present paper,
is part of understanding how exactly intelligence can or must
intervene in the invention and intentional learning of grammar.
Intelligence has many facets, but it surely involves the
ability to make models and solve problems by thinking
through a solution, rather than trial and error in the world.
We operationalise this in our experiments (including the one
reported here) through re-entrance: In order to model the
expected impact of their utterance on the hearer and thus
find out whether there is ambiguity, risk of misinterpretation,
combinatorial search, or other problems, speakers re-enter the
sentence they produced and use themselves as models of
the hearer[14]. Similarly hearers first parse and interpret the
sentence as well as they can and solicit additional feedback
if necessary, but then they use themselves as a model of the
speaker in order to reconstruct missing or different rules in
their lexicon and grammar through abduction [15].
A second facet of intelligence is that learning may take
place through diagnosis and repair. Diagnosis means to detect
what may be problematic, risky, or mistaken, and repair means
to activate strategies or recruit tools that expand behavior
to deal with the problem. For example, somebody acquiring
the skill of mountain climbing progressively discovers that at
some point he is going to need better shoes, warmer clothes,
hooks, and then later on perhaps ropes or a sleeping bag.
We will apply the same approach in bootstrapping languages.
Agents have various diagnostics which they apply to their
language production and comprehension processes including
the models they make of the other. For example, they may
detect that there is a word in the input they do not know or
that there is part of the meaning for which they do not have a
word yet. Diagnostics are assembled and then repair strategies
evoked to deal with them. A repair strategy typically expands
or changes the language inventory but it may also involve
the recruitment of new cognitive mechanisms. We will show
concrete examples of this approach in the remainder of the
paper.
A third facet of intelligence is the ability to scaffold the
growth of complexity in acquiring a complex skill. In social
learning, care givers play a very important role to simplify the
world and give challenges to a child, but even young children
are able to regulate the complexity of their interactions with
the world, if only by ignoring many details that they cannot
handle yet, and there is clear evidence that growth processes
take place in the developing brain, including recruitment of
connections between neural subsystems under performance
pressure. All this appears necessary because many learning
methods are only effective if their inputs are scaffolded and
if they start out with limited resources that are gradually
expanded [7]. The question how complexity growth can be
regulated autonomously by agents in a distributed fashion is
the key topic of the present paper. Before turning to that
subject, we first introduce the kind of diagnosis and repair
strategies that agents are able to recruit and what kind of
dynamics results when they are applied (cf. [21]).
II. DIAGNOSIS AND REPAIR STRATEGIES
We assume that the meaning to be expressed by the
speaker consists of a set of predicates and arguments.
For example, “the big ball next to the red box” starts
from: ‘big(obj1), ball(obj1), next-to(obj1,obj2), red(obj2),
box(obj2)’. The hearer must reconstruct this meaning which
will be an expression with variables: ‘big(?x), ball(?x), next-
to(?x,?y), red(?y), box(?y)’ which is then matched against
a world model derived from perception to find bindings for
these variables and hence a viable interpretation, for example,
?x may map to obj1, ?y to obj2. The challenge of the
agents is to invent a communication system that will allow
them to make these mappings without a prior agreed upon
lexicon nor grammar. Agents play description games. They
describe to each other a scene which has a potential set of
possible descriptions and the game succeeds if the meaning
reconstructed by the hearer is compatible and unambiguous
with the scene they are both looking at. For example, if the
speaker says “ball” and the hearer indeed detects a ball in the
scene, the game is a success. If there is more than one ball or
the hearer does not know the word ball, the game would be a
failure.
New lexical items appear in a language because parts of
meaning could not be covered adequately with existing words.
To implement this strategy, the speaker has a diagnostic ‘un-
covered meaning’ which is repaired by inventing a new word
and associating it with that meaning. This may either result in
a holistic coding or in compositional coding if already parts of
the meaning could be covered with existing words. The hearer
has a diagnostic ‘unknown word’ when an unknown word is
found in the input. He can repair by grabbing the inferred
uncovered meaning and associating it with this new word. We
also assume that agents update the scores of the words in their
lexicon following the lateral inhibition dynamics introduced in
[12].
Let us see what effect this has when we supply agents
with increasingly more complex meanings and expect them
to handle it. More complex means that they have to express
increasingly more objects in the scene (starting from 1), or
that there is increasingly more sharing of variables between
predicates. Results for experiments with the purely lexical
strategy for 5 runs with 5 agents playing 4000 games are
shown in figure 1. We see that quite quickly agents reach a
high level of communicative success and the lexicon becomes
optimal after about 1500 games. Note that at first the lexicon
contains more words than necessary, simply because in a
distributed population some agents may invent a new word
independently of the other ones, but the lateral inhibition will
efficiently dampen the incoherence. Since there are about 13
predicates in the example domain, an optimal lexicon is around
13 words.
However when the challenge is increased to include co-
referential variables, communicative success starts to drop.
This is simply because agents do not express what belongs
to what. For example, if the hearer gets “ball left-of box” he
derives ‘ball(?x), left-of(?y,?z), and box(?u)’ where ?x,?y,?z,
and ?u are variables. He cannot derive from purely lexical
means which object is left of the other one, except with a
holistic coding. So when the scores of the existing lexical items
is very low because they do not reach success, the lexicon of
the agents begins to increase again as they use now holistic
coding to cope with the more complex meanings. Indeed if we
continue the experiment (not shown in figure 1) we will see
that communicative success starts to climb back up, but only
at the expense of a much larger lexicon which is slower to get
off the ground, more difficult to learn, and more expensive in
terms of memory resources.
A way to reach communicative success more effectively
is to recruit another strategy: The speaker, while modeling
the parsing and interpretation process of the hearer, could
detect that there are variables which are co-referential. If that
is the case, he could introduce a grammatical construction
that signals that these two variables are to be considered co-
referential thus avoiding potential ambiguities for the hearer
(as explained in more detail in [18]). The hearer in turn could
also have a diagnostic to detect co-referential variables and
then abduct a similar construction. For example, suppose the
meaning of “big” is ‘big(?x)’ and of “ball” ‘ball(?y)’. In “big
ball” both variables refer to the same object so that ?x is co-
referential with ?y. A grammatical construction maps a combi-
nation of predicates on the semantic side with a combination of
words on the syntactic side and then establishes co-reference
between variables. Grammatical constructions are not in terms
Fig. 1. Experiments where 5 agents use a purely lexical language to
bootstrap a communication system. The x-axis shows the number of games.
The y-axis shows communicative success and lexicon size. The strategy is
initially successful but cannot cope when the complexity of meanings begins
to increase.
of specific predicates and specific words but in terms of
semantic and syntactic categories (like noun, adjective, etc.)
so that the construction has wider applicability. Of course,
in our experiments no categories are supplied to the agents
because a theory of grammar emergence has to explain how
such categories can ever arise in a population. Instead, they
invent their own syntactic and semantic categories and impose
them on the linguistic material. They then start to adjust
and coordinate these categories the same way they coordinate
perceptual categories through language [20].
Human language users clearly try to re-use as much as pos-
sible words, categories, or constructions in order to minimise
the size of the language inventory, and thus avoid pressure on
memory or ease transmission. This principle can be integrated
in the repair strategy. Thus if an agent has already a syntactic
pattern in a construction for “red ball” (e.g. ADJ+NOUN) and
now needs to handle “green ball” or “red box”, the agent will
reuse the existing pattern by categorising “green” as Adjective
and “box” as Noun. So the use of a newly introduced category
will progressively spread in the lexicon of the population,
and we can measure this spread by counting the number of
words that belong to a particular category. In case of syntactic
ambiguity (a single word belonging to more than one syntactic
category) the number of category associations will be larger
than the number of words in the lexicon.
Figure 2 shows the impact of adding these diagnostic and
repair strategies to the lexical ones discussed earlier. Again
we, as experimenters, regulate the complexity of the input.
The lexicon shows the same overshoot in the beginning
and then stabilises around 13 words as competing words
are resolved and lexical coherence reached. The necessary
grammatical constructions are built early on. They are similar
to the Adj-Noun construction discusssed above, but without
any significant syntax, just a mapping of semantic to syntactic
categories. The graph also shows ’grammaticality’, the running
average of the number of utterances that make use of grammar.
Overall, we see that the agents are able to cope with increasing
Fig. 2. Experiments where 5 agents use grammatical constructions in addition
to a lexicon. They are now able to maintain communicative success even as
complexity of meanings increases. The graph shows also the grammar size, as
well as grammaticality (the number of sentences which required grammatical
as opposed to only lexical rules) and the amount of search, which is steadily
increasing.
complexity in their meaning space but it comes at a price. The
amount of search required during parsing steadily increases
because there are multiple ways in which constructions can be
applied. If nothing is done, the combinatorial search problem
becomes so large that parsing can no longer terminate within a
reasonable time period. So there is again a ceiling of meaning
complexity that the agents can handle efficiently.
Multiple hypotheses in parsing arise unavoidably as soon
as the same syntactic pattern is re-used as part of a bigger
structure and as soon as the same syntactic pattern is used with
different levels of detail. For example, it is possible to build
a noun phrase with just an article and a noun (”the box”) but
also with an article, an adjective and a noun (”the big box”), or
two noun phrases combined with a preposition (”a small box
next to the orange ball”), and so on. Unless there is additional
syntax, ”a” or ”the” in the latter example can both be combined
with either ”box” or ”ball”, and ”big” or ”orange” can equally
be combined with both nouns. Ignoring word order, the phrase
can also be parsed as ”(an orange ball) next to (the small box)”.
Clearly languages introduce syntactic means to restrict the set
of possible combinations which otherwise would quickly run
out of hand. In English, this additional syntax is usually based
on word order, but other languages may use other syntactic
devices such as agreement between number and gender. For
example, in the French sentence “une belle fille voit un beau
garc¸on” (a beautiful girl sees a beautiful boy) feminine versus
masculine gender of article, adjective and noun unmistakably
specifies which words belong together in a single noun phrase
and so the word order is strictly speaking not needed.
An earlier paper [21] reported an additional strategy in
the form of a diagnostic with which agents can detect that
combinatorial search is happening and a repair whereby they
tighten the grammatical rules involved by adding more syntax.
For example, the adjective is now forced to come before the
noun and this then gives a clue that the two words form part
of the same structure and their meanings have co-referential
Fig. 3. Experiments where 5 agents now tighten grammatical constructions
with additional syntax in order to avoid combinatorial search. We see a drastic
reduction in the search needed.
variables. Of course, the specific syntactic constraint that
is introduced by an agent is open and so agents have to
co-ordinate their syntactic conventions through socio-cultural
dynamics the same way they co-ordinate the lexicon, the
ontologies, and the other rules of the grammar. Results in
figure 3 show that this helps the agents to cope. There is
a rapid climb of communicative success in the beginning
and overshoot in lexicon size before it becomes optimal.
We also see the emergence and coordination of grammatical
constructions with the same characteristic curve: an overshoot
(in the sense of more constructions are circulating in the
population than strictly needed) because there are different
ways to add syntax to a construction (e.g. Adj-Noun versus
Noun-Adj order) followed by a stabilisation and optimisation
phase due to lateral inhibition. The most important point, seen
in the bottom graph, is that the search space is now completely
under control and parsing has become deterministic.
This series of experiments is clearly an important break-
through in the emergence of grammar, but it uses a fundamen-
tal assumption which is not tenable in the long run, namely
we, the experimenters, regulate the challenge by increasing the
semantic complexity, and we also regulate when additional
cognitive mechanisms (in other words repair strategies) are
to be integrated in the language faculty of the agents. In
this paper we take away these assumptions by showing that
agents can autonomously regulate the input/output complexity
and the recruitment of strategies to build and learn lexicons
and grammars. The key idea is to incorporate a general
motivational system based on the autotelic principle.
III. THE AUTOTELIC PRINCIPLE
Several motivational theories have been studied in psychol-
ogy and used as inspiration in artificial systems. Some are
based on extrinsic motivation based on reward and punish-
ment such as in re-enforcement learning [9]. In this case,
an outside force could potentially regulate complexity as in
the experiments discussed so far. Other theories are based on
intrinsic motivation, such as curiosity-driven learning, which
Fig. 4. Three emotional states related to motivation. The flow experience
arises in the zone when there is an appropriate balance between challenge
and skill. When the skill is consistently too high for the challenge, there is
an experience of boredom. When the skill is consistently too low, there is an
experience of anxiety. To maintain flow, the challenge needs to be increased to
avoid boredom. Alternatively when the challenge is too high, learning possibly
based on new cognitive mechanisms needs to be recruited to avoid anxiety.
is based on the desire to improve prediction [11]. Agents
will first consider simple situations before they move on
to more complex ones because they choose the situation in
which they have the highest chance to increase their predictive
success. Here we use another principle also based on intrinsic
motivation, originally identified by the humanistic psychol-
ogist Csikszenmihalyi, and based on studying the activities
of painters, rock climbers, surgeons, and other people who
showed to be deeply involved in some very complex activity
for the sake of doing it, i.e. without direct reward in the form of
financial or status compensation [6]. He called these activities
autotelic. ”Autotelic” signifies that the motivational driving
force (”telos”) comes from the individual herself (”auto”)
instead of from an external source, administered by rewards
and punishments. Autotelic activities induce a strong form of
enjoyment which Csikszentmihalyi has characterised as ”flow”
and he has argued that this flow experience arises when there
is a balance beween challenge and skill.
According to Csikszentmihalyi, those who manage to an-
chor their motivation systems into the flow experience not only
have very satisfactory lives, but they often reach unusual levels
of excellence in their field. Conversely, when the challenge
is too high for the available skill and when there is at the
same time no hope to develop appropriate skills by learning,
frustration and even anxiety sets in and a person may get
paralysed and eventually develop symptoms of withdrawal and
depression. When the challenge is too low for the available
skill, boredom sets in and the long term reaction may be
equally negative. The optimal regime is somewhere in between
the two, when there is a match of challenge and skill. So
to remain psychologically healthy, an individual needs to be
able to decrease challenge when it is too high so as to get
an opportunity to increase skills, but it is equally important
that the individual can increase challenge when the skill has
become higher than required to cope with the challenge.
Moreover the environment should generate new opportunities
for the individual to grow, so that if she wants to increase
challenge she can do so. Flow is not a steady state. When
an activity is done a lot, skill normally increases so that
it becomes boring and new challenges need to be found.
Consequently an individual seeking the flow experience is
always ‘on the move’.
The autotelic principle is not only relevant for understanding
the motivational dynamics of a single individual, like a moun-
tain climber trying to climb mountains of progressively greater
complexity with increasingly more complex tools. It is also
relevant for understanding the regulation of the complexity
in interactions between two individuals, for example between
tennis players. A player with low ability should play against
one at the same level (if she wants to have fun anyway)
and select more skillfull opponents if her own skill has
sufficiently grown to deal with a higher challenge. When this
is done in a group, the result will be a progressive increase
in the complexity that all players can handle, and we envision
that something similar happens when a group of agents is
bootstrapping an emergent communication system.
In an earlier paper, we already proposed an operationali-
sation of the autotelic principle for the domain of robotics
[16] and we now apply it to the domain of language. Even
though Csikszentmihalyi’s basic idea remains valid, we need
to substantially expand and alter it to make it work from
a computational point of view. First we need more precise
operational notions for challenge, performance, confidence,
and resources. Then we show the dynamics governing the
whole system.
IV. OPERATIONALISING THE AUTOTELIC PRINCIPLE
The overall behavior of an agent is based on a chain
of subsystems where output of one is input to the other.
Thus in language production, the perceptual system produces
segmentation and features for the conceptual system. The
conceptual system then plans what to say based on the output
of the perceptual system. The language system then turns
this conceptualisation into a sentence and the speech system
transforms a sentence into an acoustic signal. In language
comprehension the same sort of subsystems are chained in
the other direction. Each of these systems is in turn complex.
For example the language system includes lexicon lookup,
morphological analysis, semantic and syntactic categorisa-
tion, application of grammatical constructions, assembly of
syntactic structure. We also assume that learning is totally
integrated with execution. Every subsystem is not only capable
to establish a particular mapping (for example decomposition
of words into word-stems and morphemes) but also to learn
the mapping.
To operationalise the autotelic principle, each subsystem of
the agent is now given (i) a way to gauge the challenge of
the output it produces for the next subsystem in the chain (for
example, the perceptual system is able to compute a com-
plexity measure for a particular scene, the conceptual model
is able to compute the complexity of the conceptualisation it
produces, etc.), and (ii) a way to set a particular challenge level
of what it will accept as input (for example, conceptualisation
may accept only scenes of a certain complexity, the language
system may accept only conceptualisations that are below a
threshold of structural detail, parsing may try to deal with
every word in the sentence or just focus on some of the
words that the lexicon can recognise, etc.). Challenge comes
usually in stages and they are cumulative in the sense that
more difficult challenges rely on handling first simpler ones.
Next the agent is given the capacity to monitor his own
performance (agents have never a total view, neither of the
global communicative success nor of the inventories used by
other agents). Each agent has an overall measure of perfor-
mance based on success or failure in the language game as a
whole and specific measures of performance tied to the subtask
each subsystem must deal with. For example, the conceptual
system has a performance measure how well it was able to
come up with a discriminating conceptualisation, the language
system has a measure whether it was able to come up with a
sentence covering the conceptualisation, etc. The overall and
local performance measures are integrated and tracked by each
subsystem in each agent.
Each subsystem of the agent also tracks the confidence it has
that it is able to reach the challenge level it posed itself. For
example, suppose that the language subsystem has set for itself
the challenge to deal with referring to single objects based on
one-place predicates, as in “ball”. As the agent has a growing
inventory of words to refer to more and more objects and is
achieving increased success in doing so, his confidence with
respect to that challenge increases, and eventually he believes
that he can handle the challenge (even though this may mean
that occasionally new words will have to be learned).
According to the recruitment theory, agents dynamically
recruit cognitive mechanisms and link them into the language
faculty if needed [19]. In this case, agents recruit diagnostic
and repair strategies which they use to build up their invento-
ries and learn those used by others. We call these the resources
available to the agent. The resources increase whenever agents
decide to add more strategies to their repertoire.
The dynamics of an autotelic agent can now be stated as
follows:
1) If the confidence of an agent grows, meaning that he
is able to reach a particular challenge level (based on
a steady series of successful games that have increased
that confidence), he decides to increase the challenge
level. For example, the language system may raise the
stakes from accepting to describe a single object to
describing two objects.
2) If performance is falling, the agent will first go back
to an earlier level of challenge that he knew how to
handle. This is necessary to stabilise the system before
trying something else.
3) If the agent goes into a limit cycle with decreased per-
formance, decreased challenge, increased performance,
increased challenge, decreased performance, decreased
challenge, etc. this means that the current set of di-
agnostics and repair strategies is inadequate to deal
with the higher challenge and hence the agent will
recruit new ones, in order words resources get increased.
Recruitment amounts to a search process, because some
mechanisms may be tried which do not have the desired
effect at all.
Note that because performance depends also on the skill
of other agents, the autotelic principle automatically handles
the regulation of complexity growth in the population as a
whole. Agents can only move to higher levels of challenge
when others are able to cope as well. Even if they themselves
reached a higher level of performance, they automatically
lower challenge levels so that other agents have a chance to get
bootstrapped into a new level of complexity. This kind of chal-
lenge level control (and thus control of input and/or output)
is spontaneously done by humans in the case of ‘motherese’
spoken to children or ‘pidgin’ spoken to foreigners unfamiliar
with the language.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Let us now illustrate this dynamics using experimental
runs from our implementations. We use the same set of
meanings as used in the experiments reported earlier. But now
an experimenter no longer controls complexity of meaning
nor what mechanisms are to be recruited when. Instead the
agents do this themselves by decreasing and increasing their
challenge levels and by recruiting at critical moments new
diagnostic and repair strategies. The experiments are with a
population of ten agents which can describe 7000 different
situations.
The first experiment illustrates what happens when agents
have no way to get out of a limit cycle that traps their challenge
growth. Agents can only recruit the lexical strategy. Averaged
results for the total population are shown in figure 5. It tracks
the following quantities: Communicative success (between 0.0
and 1.0): This is the overall success in the language game
for all agents. Failure is either due to the need to execute a
repair strategy (for example invent a new word) or because
the meaning could not be mapped unambiguously onto the
scene. Lexicon size: The total number of different words in
the lexicons of all agents. Resources: The number of repair
strategies that are used. This is constant in this experiment.
Confidence: This shows how close agents are to reach the
challenge level that they have set themselves.
The initial challenge level is set by the agents to 2.0 (they
talk at least about one object and avoid any uncertainty due to
unexpressed co-referentiality of variables). We see that they
progressively reach the confidence that they can handle this
challenge level after about 4200 games. The lexicon grows
to about 19 words and then starts to become more optimal
due to lateral inhibition. Communicative success also rapidly
increases from 0.0 and then stays at a maximum of 1.0. So
agents feel confident enough to increase the challenge level.
They now start talking about at most two objects avoiding
interpretational ambiguity. The confidence of some agents is
indeed beginning to increase but quite quickly, they run into
problems with a 30 % drop in performance (around game
4500). Due to failures, the lexicon begins to disintegrate and
Fig. 5. A first experiment with autotelic agents. We see that their skill
wavers around the first challenge level, showing a limit cycle behavior as
they decrease and increase challenge.
Fig. 6. Experiment with two agents using a lexical strategy to invent a
language. As this strategy is not enough as complexity increases they keep
falling back and are trapped in a limit cycle.
becomes less coherent (visible because the number of words
increases again). Agents fall below their original confidence
level and set the challenge level back to a lower level. As
they now only handle simpler cases again, communicative
success rises once more and the lexicon optimises. This leads
to greater confidence, an increase in challenge level, and the
same behavior repeats itself.
The limit cycle behavior is even more clearly visible when
we only look at two agents (figure 6). We see that the
confidence keeps going up and down. Agents reach success,
increase the challenge (this is not shown) but then have to
move back to an earlier challenge level so that they need
to deal with simpler situations and hence can regain success.
Each time it takes a while before their lexicon stabilises again.
The diagram in figure 7 shows the same dynamics plotted as
a trajectory in the performance/confidence space.
In the next experiment (figure 8), agents are able to escape
the limit cycle by recruiting other repair strategies. The graph
shows two additional quantities: Grammar size: The total
number of constructions in the grammars of all agents. and
Category spread (moving up to the size of the lexicon): The
spreading of syntactic categories. Recruitment takes place after
Fig. 7. This diagram plots the trajectory of the agent dynamics in the
performance vs. confidence space.
Fig. 8. A second experiment where autotelic agents have now grammatical re-
pair strategies. Agents are able to escape the limit cycle and move confidently
towards a higher challenge level by introducing grammatical constructions and
syntactic categories.
about 6000 games. We see an increase in the resources used (to
reach five repair strategies) and consequently a spreading in the
population of the categories until all words in the lexicon have
them. Note how the lexicon stabilises to an optimal size and
how communicative success increases to become maximum.
At game 16000, agents feel confident enough that they can
increase their challenge levels once more. They now attempt
to talk about at most three objects, still avoiding uncertainty
due to unexpressed co-referentiality of variables. As no other
repair strategies are recruitable we see again a limit cycle
behavior, wavering around the second challenge level. The
syntactic categories of the agents are beginning to destabilise,
in the sense that ambiguities are arising (one word having more
than one category), and communicative success is decreasing.
Figure 9 zooms in on the lower part of this graph which
shows clearly the critical point when agents recruit the gram-
matical strategy and thus move to a higher plane of complexity.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The paper brought together a number of threads that we
explored separately in our earlier experiments: the use of a
social dynamics in which agents invent language forms and
coordinate them by adjusting weights using lateral inhibition,
the use of diagnostics and repair strategies to organise the
Fig. 9. This figure zooms in on the previous one. The different challenge
levels are indicated with hooks. Agents can overcome the first two challenge
levels but are still on their way to the third. Recruitment of new strategies
leads to an increase in the resources, an increase in the size of the grammar
(which was empty) and a spreading of the syntactic categories.
invention and adoption of progressively more complex lan-
guage in a group of agents, the autotelic principle which
regulates growth of developmental complexity, and the re-
cruitment theory which argues that the language faculty is a
dynamic configuration of cognitive mechanisms self-organised
by agents in order to cope with challenges in the tasks and do-
mains they encounter. We showed how these various principles
interact to explain how a group of agents could progressively
bootstrap a language system starting with the emergence of
a lexicon for talking about single objects to the emergence
of grammatical constructions with syntax. The experiments
discussed here are only the beginning. We now have the agent
software architecture to easily implement new diagnostics
that focus on other functional pressures on language and
new repair strategies that introduce lexical, grammatical or
syntactic material to deal with them. As we further scale
up, we expect to see greater difficulty in uneven skill levels
between the agents. Indeed if one agent has already a fully
developed grammar and now is confronted with an agent that
is still learning the first words, the more mature agent needs
to adjust challenge levels, but only in interaction with the
absolute beginner. We suspect that this requires that agents
can individually gauge the performance of other agents.
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